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Humans need to be able to selectively control their memories. This capability is often
investigated in directed forgetting (DF) paradigms. In item-method DF, individual items
are presented and each is followed by either a forget- or remember-instruction. On
a surprise test of all items, memory is then worse for to-be-forgotten items (TBF)
compared to to-be-remembered items (TBR). This is thought to result mainly from
selective rehearsal of TBR, although inhibitory mechanisms also appear to be recruited
by this paradigm. Here, we investigate whether the mnemonic consequences of a
forget instruction differ from the ones of incidental encoding, where items are presented
without a specific memory instruction. Four experiments were conducted where un-
cued items (UI) were interspersed and recognition performance was compared between
TBR, TBF, and UI stimuli. Accuracy was encouraged via a performance-dependent
monetary bonus. Experiments varied the number of items and their presentation
speed and used either letter-cues or symbolic cues. Across all experiments, including
perceptually fully counterbalanced variants, memory accuracy for TBF was reduced
compared to TBR, but better than for UI. Moreover, participants made consistently fewer
false alarms and used a very conservative response criterion when responding to TBF
stimuli. Thus, the F-cue results in active processing and reduces false alarm rate, but this
does not impair recognition memory beyond an un-cued baseline condition, where only
incidental encoding occurs. Theoretical implications of these findings are discussed.
Keywords: episodic memory, item method, selective rehearsal, ironic process, inhibition (psychology), directed
forgetting
INTRODUCTION
Humans need to manage their cognitive resources in order to control their behavior. We are
therefore able to ignore irrelevant stimuli and withhold pre-potent automatic responses to remain
focused on a current task, although this is eﬀortful and there are clear limits to human capacities
for cognitive control (e.g., Botvinick et al., 2001). In episodic memory, as in other cognitive
domains, there is constant need for selection to keep memory up-to-date with current demands.
Both everyday-life and scientiﬁc research demonstrate our ability to selectively encode and retrieve
memory contents (Levy and Anderson, 2009). In school, as well as in legal or more mundane
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contexts, we might be presented with information that we are
supposed to remember as important for the future. Still, every
now and then this information might turn out to be unimportant,
irrelevant, or even false after presentation and we may be then
told to forget it. Scientiﬁcally, variants of the directed forgetting
(DF) task provide a means to study selection and updating
processes in memory (Golding and MacLeod, 1998). In list-
method DF, participants are shown pairs of lists and after the ﬁrst
list of such a pair they are instructed to either remember all items
on the previous list for future testing or to forget this list. Then,
in both cases a second list is presented for further learning. At
the end of the experiment, unexpectedly for the participant, items
from both lists are tested. The between-list forget instruction
typically results in poorer memory for list 1 items and better
memory for list 2 items, whereas the reverse is true following
the remember instruction. Because this pattern is only apparent
in free recall, but not in recognition testing, retrieval inhibition
has been a dominant account for the list-method DF eﬀect (for
review, see Anderson and Hanslmayr, 2014).
In item-method DF, individual items are immediately followed
by an instruction. To-be-remembered items (TBR) are followed
by a ‘remember’ (R) cue while to-be-forgotten items (TBF) are
followed by a ‘forget’ (F) cue. Later, memory is tested for all
items, regardless of their initial instruction. This typically leads
to a DF eﬀect, better memory for TBR than for TBF. The eﬀect
is apparent both in recall and recognition (Basden and Basden,
1996) and has been shown for a variety of materials (Lehman
et al., 2001; Hourihan and Taylor, 2006; Hauswald and Kissler,
2008; Hourihan et al., 2009; Quinlan et al., 2010; Nowicka et al.,
2011; Zwissler et al., 2011).
Although originally thought to reﬂect repression in a Freudian
sense (Weiner, 1968), item-method DF has been subsequently
mainly attributed to selective rehearsal (Basden and Basden,
1998), assuming that TBR are rehearsed more than TBF: upon
presentation, each item is held in a standby-like mode and its
processing is postponed until the instruction appears. An R
instruction then leads to further rehearsal, while an F instruction
is supposed to terminate any further processing, leading to
passive decay of the item’s representation. As a consequence, only
TBR are selectively encoded and therefore better remembered
than TBF.
Recent evidence suggests that participants either consciously
of unconsciously make use of quite elaborate strategies to
facilitate forgetting. For instance, item-method DF has been
shown to interact with the loudness illusion in memory (Foster
and Sahakyan, 2012): This illusion refers to the observation that
when items that vary in loudness are presented for learning,
participants have the subjective impression of remembering loud
items better than quiet one, although objectively this is not
the case (Rhodes and Castel, 2009). However, speciﬁcally in
a situation where loud and quiet items are embedded in an
item-method DF task, loud items are really recalled better than
quiet ones. The same is not true for various control conditions,
including ones that diﬀerently emphasize, via value assignment,
the importance of remembering loud items, suggesting a
speciﬁcity of the eﬀect to a situation that requires intentional
forgetting. Selectively rehearsing loud items, given an adequate
opportunity, may be used as either an explicit or an implicit
strategy to forget.
Somewhat reminiscent of the original repression account,
recent behavioral evidence also demonstrates that active
inhibitory processing is triggered by the forget cue in this
paradigm (e.g., Fawcett and Taylor, 2010; Lee et al., 2013). Zacks
and Hasher (1994) ﬁrst proposed mechanisms of attentional
inhibition to operate in item-method DF and a wealth of
behavioral data now indicates that the instruction to forget in
item-method DF ampliﬁes eﬀects of inhibition of return (IOR;
Taylor, 2005; Taylor and Fawcett, 2011, 2012; Thompson and
Taylor, 2015). Although originally thought to aﬀect only motoric
IOR magnitude (Taylor, 2005; Taylor and Fawcett, 2011, 2012),
greater slowing of return to target location following F-cue
than following R-cue has recently been demonstrated in both
motoric and visual IOR (Thompson and Taylor, 2015). The
greater IOR eﬀect following the F-cue has been also shown
to be due to genuine IOR magniﬁcation, rather than due
to facilitation of reorientation to the other side (Taylor and
Fawcett, 2012). Together, these data are consistent with the
interpretation that inhibition of spatial attention is increased
by the forget instruction. This has led to the speculation
that TBF-item’s memory representations along a spatial saliency
map are rendered less accessible than those of the TBR items
(Thompson and Taylor, 2015). However, interactions betweenDF
patterns and attention mechanisms seem to be paradigm-speciﬁc:
whereas there is evidence that attention withdraws from forget
items and reduces the processing of other information that is
presented in temporal or spatial proximity (Fawcett and Taylor,
2008; Taylor and Fawcett, 2012; Lee and Hsu, 2013), very recent
data demonstrates that distractibility is not generally increased
following a forget instruction. For instance, reaction times to
interspersed attentional orienting probes are not aﬀected by a
preceding F-cue (Taylor and Hamm, 2015).
Therefore, inhibitory mechanisms seem to be invoked by the
forget instruction, but eﬀects are paradigm-speciﬁc rather than
domain-general.
Neuroscientiﬁc studies indicate more frontal and less parietal
activation in response to the F- than to the R-instruction (Paz-
Caballero et al., 2004; Wylie et al., 2008; van Hooﬀ and Ford,
2011; Rizio and Dennis, 2013) as well as a positive correlation
between frontal brain activity and magnitude of the DF-eﬀect
(Hauswald et al., 2011) indirectly supporting the view that some
form of active inhibition is at work in item-method DF.
Whereas inhibition of spatial attention has been convincingly
demonstrated in item-method DF, the mnemonic consequences
have been less clearly speciﬁed. For instance, in the clinical
literature the Freudian suppression metaphor is still discussed
(e.g., Cottencin et al., 2006). It is clear that TBF is associated
with poorer memory than TBR and that the F-instruction induces
active, in the case of spatial attention also inhibitory, processing.
Still, the relationship between IOR reaction time and the memory
DF eﬀect is uncertain. Fawcett and Taylor (2010) found that
for successfully forgotten TBF, IOR was bigger than it was
for remembered TBF, suggesting a link between the processes
involved. However, this association is not reported in Taylor and
Fawcett (2011) or Thompson et al. (2014).
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Thus, extant evidence demonstrates that people are indeed
able to selectively encode some material while ignoring, perhaps
even actively inhibiting, other material presented for the same
period of time. However, a diﬀerent line of evidence indicates
that for instance thought suppression is often ineﬀective and
can result in paradoxical eﬀects (Wegner et al., 1987). Regarding
DF, it has been shown that prolonging cue presentation results
in better memory for TBF and TBR items alike (Lee et al.,
2007; Bancroft et al., 2013). This contradicts the assumption
that TBF items decay passively and is also diﬃcult to reconcile
with the idea of eﬀective memory inhibition. As a consequence
the question arises, how TBF and TBR compare to a condition
where items are encoded only incidentally because they are not
followed by a speciﬁc memory instruction. If prolonging cue
presentation improves rather than impairs memory of TBF items,
suggesting that active, but not inhibitory processing is induced
by TBF, how will no cue at all or an unspeciﬁc cue compare?
Evidence from the Think-No Think paradigm underscores the
possibility of successful intentional memory suppression of
paired-associates, even below a baseline level (Anderson and
Green, 2001; Anderson et al., 2004). Similarly, automatic memory
inhibition of some items below a given baseline has been shown
for the retrieval-induced forgetting paradigm (Anderson et al.,
1994).
A wealth of research on thought control mechanisms has
demonstrated ironic processes when people try to suppress their
thoughts (Wegner et al., 1987; Wegner, 1994, 1997; Wenzlaﬀ
and Wegner, 2000), although there are important diﬀerences
between thought suppression and item-method DF paradigms.
For instance, in ironic thought control the eﬀect disappears when
alternative thoughts are instructed. Still, by analogy, in item-
method DF, any cue might initially re-orient participants to the
preceding stimulus. If TBF cues were perceived as ‘suppress’
commands, the success and behavioral consequences of such
suppression attempts might be uncertain (Wegner et al., 1987;
Wegner, 1994, 1997; Wenzlaﬀ and Wegner, 2000), although the
presence of other items to which processing resources could be
redirected may counteract any ironic processes.
Here, we addressed the status of forget items in item method
DF by introducing un-cued items (UI) into the paradigm.
We tested, whether memory for TBF is equally bad (selective
rehearsal) or perhaps even worse (memory inhibition) than if
no instruction were given, and items were only incidentally
encoded. The presence of UI may provide participants to redirect
their processing resources to these items, further reducing TBF
encoding. If, however, F-cues initiate re-alerting (or ironic
monitoring as found in thought suppression research), TBF could
still be actively processed and highlighted to a certain extent. In
that case UI would be remembered worse than both TBR and also
TBF.
As in several previous studies we use a recognition memory
design with complex pictorial stimuli and similar paired
distracters (Quinlan et al., 2010; Hauswald et al., 2011; Nowicka
et al., 2011; Zwissler et al., 2011). This facilitates a separate
analysis of recognition accuracy and response bias. We have
been using picture stimuli in an eﬀort to obtain more language-
and culture-independent results and in order to be able to
work with linguistically heterogeneous clinical populations (e.g.,
Zwissler et al., 2012; Baumann et al., 2013). So far, the basic
mechanism of selective rehearsal has been shown to apply also
to pictorial stimuli (Hourihan et al., 2009), but diﬀerences may
exist precluding generalization of results to studies using word
stimuli.
To increase motivation to show full eﬀort on the ﬁnal test,
participants received a performance-dependent monetary bonus
encouraging performance accuracy (see also MacLeod, 1999).
We expect diﬀerential processing of TBR, TBF, andUI items to
be reﬂected in memory performance. Selective rehearsal should
improve recognition accuracy for TBR over both TBF and UI.
We test, whether memory accuracy diﬀers between incidental
encoding of UI and intentional forgetting as instructed for TBF.
The diﬀerent instructions also could aﬀect participants’ readiness
to respond to an item given a similar amount of mnemonic
information. This would be reﬂected in distinct response biases:
Because strengthening an item’s memory representation leads to
a more conservative response bias (Hirshman, 1995), according
to selective rehearsal, TBR items should be responded to
most conservatively. If TBF cues prompt a distinct, potentially
inhibitory eﬀect on response criterion setting, response bias for
TBF items should be most conservative.
To investigate the eﬀect of implicit encoding in item method
DF, the fate of TBF items is compared with both TBR and UI
items. Four experiments were conducted: Experiment 1 presents
a basic comparison of recognition memory for the three item
types, Experiment 2 uses a longer item list, and Experiment 3
replaces the instructions by three symbolic cues, addressing the
possibility that physical cue characteristics aﬀect performance.
Experiment 4 tests the eﬀects of symbolic cues with a diﬀerent
item set.
EXPERIMENT 1
Method
Participants
Thirty-one students at the University of Konstanz, Germany,
(24 women; mean age = 21.67, SE = 0.44; range: 18–28 years)
participated in return for course credit or 3 € basic compensation.
They could earn additional performance-dependent bonus. In all
experiments, participants gave written informed consent and the
research was conducted in accordance with the Declaration of
Helsinki. The experiment was approved by the Ethics Committee
of the University of Konstanz.
Stimuli
Seventy-ﬁve target-distracter pairs of images were used for
memory testing. Pairs were thematically unique within the set
and diﬀered only in perceptual detail (see Figure 1 for examples),
thus allowing for a separate analysis of hits and false alarms
in response to the diﬀerently cued items. The images showed
people, landscapes, animals, or social scenes. One member of
each pair was assigned to each of two sets (A and B), image-set
assignment was counterbalanced, and image-cue assignment was
randomized. During learning, all set A images were presented
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FIGURE 1 | Illustration of the picture sets for experiments 1–3 showing three representative target-distracter pairs.
in random order. During recognition, all images from both
sets were shown at random, set B images serving as related
lures.
Procedure: Learning Phase
Participants were explained that they would be presented pictures
some of which would be relevant to successful task performance
and others would not. Relevant pictures would be followed by
either a ‘remember it’ (R) cue or by a ‘forget it’ (F) cue. Irrelevant
pictures were not further instructed (‘un-cued’ ∼ U). The exact
wording of the instruction was: “You will see a series of pictures.
Some will be followed by a ‘MMM’ cue. Then it is important
to remember the preceding picture for later testing. Some will
be followed by a ‘VVV’ cue. Then it is important to forget the
preceding picture. Some pictures will not be followed by a cue.”
Up front, there was no instruction on how to behave in response
to items that were not followed by a cue. If participants asked
what the purpose of the un-cued pictures was, they were told that
these served to ensure stable time lags between the cued pictures
in a subsequent imaging study. Then, all pictures from one set
were shown in sequence, each for 2 s. Immediately after each
picture either the F instruction symbolized by ‘VVV’ (‘vergessen’
∼ ‘forget’), the R instruction signaled by ‘MMM’ (‘merken’ ∼
‘remember’) or a blank screen appeared for 2 s. Then, a ﬁxation
cross was presented for 1 s, after which the next picture was
shown.
After learning, a break of 10 min took place during
which participants were asked to perform a speeded attention
endurance test (d2; Brickenkamp, 1994) to ensure that they did
not further rehearse the material. This paper–pencil test requires
participants to identify and mark target symbols embedded
among similar distracter symbols.
Procedure: Recognition Phase
Before the recognition test, participants were told that they now
should try to accurately recognize ALL initially presented images,
regardless of their previous instruction and that they could earn
0.2 € for each correctly recognized picture, but would lose the
same amount for false alarms, perfect performance resulting in
a maximum of 15 € (75 × 0.2 €). Thereby, recognition accuracy
was reinforced and guessing was discouraged.
During the test, a random sequence of the 75 old and
75 similar new pictures (thematically paired distracters), was
administered. Each picture was shown for 300 ms and
participants were asked to decide by button press whether they
had seen it before. Presentation time for recognition was kept
short to encourage spontaneous responses, but reaction time was
not limited. After each response, a ﬁxation cross was presented
for 700 ms before the next picture appeared. Experimental
material was presented on a laptop computer (Dell Latitude
D830) using Presentation Software (Neurobehavioral Systems
Inc., Albany, NY, USA). Upon completion of the experiment,
participants were paid and debriefed about the purpose of the
study.
Statistical Analyses
Statistical calculations were performed with SPSS 20.0 (SPSS Inc.,
www.spss.com). Data were analyzed using repeated-measures
ANOVAs with the within-factor cue (Forget, Remember, Un-
cued). ANOVAs were calculated for hits and false alarms, as
well as for discrimination accuracy and response bias. Post
hoc comparisons were calculated with an alpha level of 0.05
using Fisher’s Least Signiﬁcant Diﬀerences test. If the sphericity
assumption was violated, degrees of freedom were corrected
according to Greenhouse–Geisser.
Results
Hits and False Alarms
Table 1 presents mean hit and false alarm rates in the ‘remember,’
‘forget,’ and ‘un-cued’ conditions for the ﬁrst experiment.
A signiﬁcant main eﬀect was found on hits [F(2,60) = 20.78;
p < 0.001; η2p = 0.41]. Post hoc comparisons showed that for
hit rate was highest for TBR, being signiﬁcantly higher than
TBF (p < 0.01) and UI (p < 0.001). Hit rate for TBF was
also higher than for UI (p < 0.01). Further, there was also a
signiﬁcant main eﬀect for false alarms [F(2,60) = 7.91; p = 0.001;
η2p = 0.21]. Post hoc comparisons showed that the false alarm
rate was considerably higher for UI lures than for TBF lures
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TABLE 1 | Experiment 1.
Hits False Alarms
Remember Forget Un-cued Remember Forget Un-cued
0.77a 0.66b 0.61c 0.14a 0.14a 0.22b
(0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Mean hit and false alarm rates in the ‘remember,’ ‘forget,’ and ‘un-cued’ condition.
Standard errors appear in parentheses below means; means in the same row
sharing the same superscript letter do not differ significantly from one each other,
means that do not share superscripts differ at p ≤ 0.05.
(p < 0.01) and TBR lures (p < 0.01), the latter two not diﬀering
(p = 0.82).
Discrimination Accuracy and Response Bias
Following Snodgrass and Corwin’s (1988) two-high-threshold
model, discrimination accuracy (Pr = hit rate – false alarm
rate) and response bias [Br = false alarm rate/(1 – Pr)] were
analyzed from the data, simultaneously taking into account hits
and false alarms and resulting in separatemeasures of recognition
accuracy and response bias in DF.1 ANOVA conﬁrmed signiﬁcant
diﬀerences in the discrimination of diﬀerently cued stimuli
[F(2,60) = 28.69; p < 0.001; η2p = 0.49] and revealed that TBR
were recognized signiﬁcantly more accurately than both TBF
(p < 0.01) and UI (p < 0.001). Crucially, Pr was signiﬁcantly
higher for TBF than for UI (p < 0.001). There was no signiﬁcant
1In old/new recognition memory experiments, hits and false alarms need to be
considered simultaneously to yield measures of memory accuracy on the one hand
and response bias on the other as participants’ recognition data will be determined
both by the actual memory strength for an item and their readiness to respond
given a certain amount of mnemonic information. Several such models have
been developed (see Snodgrass and Corwin, 1988). Here, we chose the two-high
threshold model. However, calculation of the d′ and Cmeasures reveals equivalent
results. For a discussion of the relative merits of diﬀerent models of recognition
memory, see e.g., (Broder and Schutz, 2009).
eﬀect on recognition bias Br [F(1.67,50.22) = 0.53; p = 0.56;
η2p = 0.02]. In general, response bias was rather conservative (Br
ranging from 0.34 to 0.38). Results are depicted in Figure 2.
Discussion Experiment 1
Experiment 1 indicates that in item-method DF, presenting
stimuli for incidental encoding with no speciﬁc instruction
results in poorer memory accuracy than both a remember and
a forget instruction. This is inconsistent with the notion of
successful memory inhibition in item-method DF. As expected
and in line with selective rehearsal, TBR were recognized more
accurately than TBF or UI. Moreover, TBF were also recognized
more accurately than UI, implying the possibility of ironic eﬀects
(Wegner et al., 1987; Wegner, 1994, 1997; Wenzlaﬀ and Wegner,
2000). Results indicate that while selective rehearsal may account
for TBR memory superiority, TBF seem to trigger active, non-
inhibitory, memory processing that exceeds the one of completely
un-cued, incidentally encoded, items. To further investigate
this, a second experiment is conducted using more pictures
and reducing picture presentation duration, thus increasing
task diﬃculty. This addresses the possibility that, in spite of
a monetary incentive to the contrary, participants somehow
remembered list A items in association with their instruction and
were guided by this on the recognition test.
EXPERIMENT 2
Method
The experimental methodsmirrored the ones used in Experiment
1 with the following exceptions:
Participants
Forty-one students took part (25 women; mean age = 23.02,
SE = 1.00; range: 18–56 years). They were recruited by posters
FIGURE 2 | Experiment 1. (A) Discrimination index for the condition Remember (R), Forget (F), and Un-cued (U). (B) Response bias for the three conditions.
∗p ≤ 0.05, ∗∗∗p ≤ 0.001.
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around University of Konstanz campus. The experiment was
approved by the Ethics Committee of the University of Konstanz.
Stimuli
The stimulus set was expanded to 90 target-distracter pairs of
similar pictures.
Procedure: Learning Phase
Presentation duration was reduced to one second.
Results
Hits and False Alarms
Table 2 presents mean hit and false alarm rates in the ‘remember,’
‘forget,’ and ‘un-cued’ conditions for the second experiment.
A signiﬁcant main eﬀect was observed for hits [F(2,80) = 31.57;
p < 0.001; η2p = 0.44]. Post hoc comparisons showed that hit
rate was highest for TBR, being signiﬁcantly higher than TBF
(p < 0.001) and UI (p < 0.001). The latter two did not diﬀer
(p = 0.24). Further, there was a signiﬁcant main eﬀect for
false alarms [F(2,80) = 16.63; p < 0.001; η2p = 0.29]. Post hoc
comparisons showed that the false alarm rate was lowest for TBF,
TABLE 2 | Experiment 2.
Hits False Alarms
Remember Forget Un-cued Remember Forget Un-cued
0.73a 0.59b 0.57b 0.28a 0.22b 0.32c
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Mean hit and false alarm rates in the ‘remember,’ ‘forget,’ and ‘un-cued’ condition.
Standard errors appear in parentheses below means; means in the same row
sharing the same superscript letter do not differ significantly from each other, means
that do not share superscripts differ at p ≤ 0.05.
false alarms for TBF being signiﬁcantly lower than TBR (p< 0.01)
and UI (p < 0.001). False Alarm rate was also signiﬁcantly lower
for TBR than UI (p< 0.05).
Discrimination Accuracy and Response Bias
Repeated measures ANOVA conﬁrmed signiﬁcant diﬀerences in
the discrimination accuracy Pr of the diﬀerently cued stimuli
[F(1.75,69.82) = 33.71; p< 0.001; η2p = 0.46]. TBR were recognized
signiﬁcantly more accurately than both TBF and UI (both
p < 0.001; see Figure 3A). Crucially, Pr was signiﬁcantly higher
for TBF than for UI (p < 0.001). There were also signiﬁcant
diﬀerences for the response bias Br [F(1.41,56.47) = 18.05;
p < 0.001; η2p = 0.31]. TBF response bias was signiﬁcantly more
conservative than TBR and UI (both p < 0.001, see Figure 3B).
TBR showed a more liberal response bias than UI (p< 0.05).
Discussion Experiment 2
As in Experiment 1, higher recognition accuracy was found
for TBR compared to TBF or UI items. Again, TBF were
recognized more accurately than UI, overall conﬁrming that
selective rehearsal can account for the TBR advantage and that
TBF induces, active, albeit for recognition memory seemingly
non-inhibitory, processing. As a new ﬁnding, in this longer
version instruction aﬀected response bias: TBF were responded
to more conservatively than TBR and UI, TBR being more liberal
than UI. Also, it has to be noted that unlike in Experiment 1, the
eﬀect is now driven more by instruction-induced changes in false
alarms than in hits, requiring further scrutiny. Possibly, because
presentation time during learning was reduced, participants
relied more on gist representation, bringing up overall false alarm
rate and increasing its contribution to the eﬀects. Interestingly,
false alarm rates were across both experiments lower for TBF
than for UI and in Experiment 2 also lower for TBF than
for TBR. However, a possible limitation of both experiments
FIGURE 3 | Experiment 2. (A) Discrimination index for the condition Remember (R), Forget (F), and Un-cued (U). (B) Response bias for the three conditions.
∗p ≤ 0.05, ∗∗p ≤ 0.01, ∗∗∗p ≤ 0.001.
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is that in the UI condition only a blank screen was used,
resulting in a perceptual diﬀerence from the other two conditions.
Explicit processing cues may automatically induce reprocessing
of the previously presented picture for both cued item types
as participants may need to refresh the cue-item association to
initiate further active processing, thus causing superior memory
for perceptually cued items in comparison with items for which
no cue appears and that after the initial rehearsal phase are
allowed to passively decay. On the other hand, the absence of a
cue may also result in UI items being on average rehearsed a little
longer until participants realize that there will be no cue. If so,
the latter possibility should reduce diﬀerences between R, F, and
U, whereas the former should enlarge it. To further examine the
pattern of results and ensure that variation in perceptual input
had no impact on the current results, a third experiment was
performed using symbolic cues for all three conditions.
EXPERIMENT 32
Method
Experiment 3 resembled Experiment 2 with the following
exceptions:
Participants
Twenty-seven students (14 women; mean age= 24.23, SE = 0.55;
range: 19–32 years) from the University of Tübingen, Germany,
participated. The experiment was approved by the Ethics
Committee of the University of Tübingen.
Procedure: Learning Phase
The letter-cues were replaced by symbolic cues. A blue circle,
a purple square and yellow triangle were randomly assigned to
represent R, F, or U. Symbol-cue assignmentwas counterbalanced
across participants. The basic procedure was identical to
Experiment 2.
Results
Twenty-six data-sets were available for analysis as data from one
participant were lost.
Hits and False Alarms
A signiﬁcant main eﬀect was observed for hits [F(2,50) = 22.51;
p < 0.001; η2p = 0.47]. TBR hit rate was signiﬁcantly higher
than TBF and UI hit rates (p < 0.001, respectively), whereas
TBF and UI did not diﬀer (p = 0.80). A signiﬁcant main eﬀect
for false alarms was also found [F(2,50) = 16.23; p < 0.001;
η2p = 0.39]. Post hoc comparisons showed that the false alarm rate
was signiﬁcantly higher for UI than for TBR (p < 0.01) and TBF
(p < 0.001), while TBR tended to be higher than TBF (p = 0.06).
Mean hit and false-alarm rates are given in Table 3.
Discrimination Accuracy and Response Bias
ANOVA conﬁrmed signiﬁcant diﬀerences in discrimination
accuracy Pr between diﬀerently cued stimuli [F(2,50) = 25.08;
2Data from this experiment have been partly reported by Zwissler et al. (2014) in
the context of a study on tDCS modulations of memory accuracy. The presently
reported data are from the sham condition in Zwissler et al. (2014).
TABLE 3 | Experiment 3.
Hits False Alarms
Remember Forget Un-cued Remember Forget Un-cued
0.73a 0.57b 0.57b 0.24a 0.20a 0.32b
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Mean hit and false alarm rates in the ‘remember,’ ‘forget,’ and ‘un-cued’ condition.
Standard errors appear in parentheses below means; means in the same row
sharing the same superscript letter do not differ significantly from each other, means
that do not share superscripts differ at p ≤ 0.05.
p < 0.001; η2p = 0.50] and revealed that TBR were recognized
signiﬁcantly more accurately than TBF (p < 0.01) and UI
(p < 0.001). Also, TBF recognition was higher than UI
(p < 0.01). As in Experiment 2, there were also signiﬁcant
diﬀerences for recognition bias Br [F(2,50) = 16.50; p < 0.001;
η2p = 0.40]. TBF response bias was signiﬁcantly more
conservative than TBR (p < 0.001) and UI (p < 0.001).
TBR and UI did not diﬀer (p = 0.19). Figure 4 illustrates this
pattern.
Discussion Experiment 3
Experiment 3 replicates ﬁndings from Experiments 1 and 2
regarding response accuracy. Furthermore, by introducing a third
(symbolic) cue in addition to F and R, a potential weakness
of the two previous experiments was addressed. Therefore, the
pattern cannot be explained by diﬀerences in the physical features
of the cues, or by the fact that F and R cues induced re-
processing, whereas UI did not. It rather has to be assumed that
a negative instruction leads to a more accurate representation
of the respective stimulus compared to no instruction at all,
although both conditions are perceptually identical. Regarding
materials, Experiment 3 is directly comparable with Experiment
2, and in both the accuracy eﬀect is carried more by false
alarms than by hit rate. In both these experiments, fewest false
alarms are made for TBF items and eﬀects on recognition bias
are observed with R stimuli being classiﬁed almost without
bias, U stimuli slightly more conservatively and F stimuli most
conservatively. This diﬀerence from Experiment 1 may result
from increasing task diﬃculty and participants’ greater reliance
on gist representation. Experiments 2 and 3 used more stimuli
and a faster presentation rate, resulting in overall lower hit
and higher false alarm rates. The response bias results depart
from the commonly observed pattern that strengthening items
leads to a more conservative response bias (e.g., Hirshman,
1995; Stretch and Wixted, 1998). The initial forget instruction
may induce a subjective underrepresentation of the frequency of
forget items on the test list (Strack and Förster, 1995; Hirshman
and Henzler, 1998), reducing participants’ readiness to respond
to these items. If so, such a subjective underrepresentation
appears not to be due to variations in perceptual input between
Experiments 2 and 3 as the pattern was very similar and if
anything, one might expect items associated with less perceptual
input (UI in Experiment 2) to be more prone to subjective
underrepresentation. There might be a small perceptual eﬀect,
since in Experiment 2 the response bias for TBR is signiﬁcantly
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FIGURE 4 | Experiment 3. (A) Discrimination index for the condition Remember (R), Forget (F), and Un-cued (U). (B) Response bias for the three conditions.
∗∗p ≤ 0.01, ∗∗∗p ≤ 0.001.
FIGURE 5 | Illustration of the revised picture sets in experiment 4 showing three representative new target-distracter pairs.
higher than for UI and this diﬀerence disappears in Experiment
3. However, in terms of response bias, the comparison with TBF
items is the same in both experiments. Still, in Experiments
1 and 2 forget and remember conditions diﬀered perceptually
from the un-cued condition. Although so far this perceptual
variation does not seem to impact the pattern of results in
a major way, a fourth experiment was conducted to replicate
the symbolic cue eﬀect. In this fourth experiment some of the
previous picture pairs were replaced with new pairs because
several participants had indicated that they found some of the
target-distracter pairs too similar and easily confusable (see
Figure 1). If so, this would have added additional noise to the
data, assuming that these pairs had been randomly distributed
across the conditions as implemented by the random picture-
condition assignment. However, if distribution of these pairs had
been uneven across conditions this could even have aﬀected the
pattern of results.
EXPERIMENT 4
Experiment 4 recorded both behavioral and EEG data. EEG data
will be fully reported elsewhere. Behaviourally, Experiment 4
resembled Experiment 3 with the following exceptions:
Method
Participants
Twenty-four students (14 women; mean age = 22.79, SE = 0.93;
range: 19–35 years) from the University of Bielefeld participated.
Performance-dependent bonus was 5 ct per correct item, adding
up to a maximum bonus of € 5. The experiment was approved by
the Ethics Committee of the University of Bielefeld.
Stimuli
Fifteen of the 90 image pairs were replaced (see Figure 5 for
examples of replacement pairs).
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Results
Hits and False Alarms
Hits and false alarms are given in Table 4. A signiﬁcant main
eﬀect was observed for hits [F(2,46) = 25.38; p< 0.001; η2p = 0.53].
TBR hit rate was again signiﬁcantly higher than TBF and UI hit
rates (p< 0.001, respectively). Also, TBF hit rate was signiﬁcantly
higher than UI hit rate (p < 0.05). No signiﬁcant eﬀect was
found for false alarms [F(2,46) = 0.14; p = 0.87; η2p = 0.01]. False
alarm rate did not diﬀer signiﬁcantly between TBR, TBF, and UI
(ps > 0.6).
Discrimination Accuracy and Response Bias
ANOVA conﬁrmed signiﬁcant diﬀerences in discrimination
accuracy Pr between diﬀerently cued stimuli [F(2,46) = 27.59;
p < 0.001; η2p = 0.55] and revealed that TBR were recognized
signiﬁcantly more accurately than TBF (p < 0.001) and UI
(p < 0.001). Also, TBF scored higher than UI (p < 0.05). As in
Experiments 2 and 3, there were also signiﬁcant diﬀerences for
recognition bias Br [F(1.48,34.11) = 9.14; p < 0.01; η2p = 0.28].
TBR response bias was signiﬁcantly less conservative than TBF
(p < 0.05) and UI (p < 0.001). TBF and UI did not diﬀer
(p = 0.49). Figure 6 illustrates this pattern.
TABLE 4 | Experiment 4.
Hits False Alarms
Remember Forget Un-cued Remember Forget Un-cued
0.74a 0.58b 0.52c 0.22a 0.21a 0.22a
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Mean hit and false alarm rates in the ‘remember,’ ‘forget,’ and ‘un-cued’ condition.
Standard errors appear in parentheses below means; means in the same row
sharing the same superscript letter do not differ significantly from each other, means
that do not share subscripts differ at p ≤ 0.05.
Discussion Experiment 4
Regarding recognition accuracy, Experiment 4, replicates
ﬁndings from Experiments 1–3. As in Experiment 1, this eﬀect
was mostly carried by hits. The data suggest that diﬃculty may
play a role in whether the consistent accuracy eﬀect is driven by
diﬀerences in hits or false alarms, possibly reﬂecting the extent
to which participants relied on gist representation. Although list
length was longer in Experiment 4 than in Experiment 1, some of
the most diﬃcult item pairs were eliminated from Experiment 4,
perhaps balancing for eﬀects of list length. In Experiment 4 as in
Experiments 2 and 3 the response bias is most lenient for TBR,
however, unlike in Experiments 2 and 3, the response bias for
UI was as conservative as for TBF. Across all experiments, false
alarm rate was always lowest for TBF. No instruction-dependent
diﬀerence in response bias was found in Experiment 1. Across the
experiments, it appears that instruction-dependent diﬀerences
in recognition accuracy with TBR being remembered more
accurately than TBF and crucially TBF more accurately than UI
is a robust phenomenon in item-method DF, whereas eﬀects
on the recognition bias are more variable. To formally assess
similarities and diﬀerences between the four experiments and
underscore the statistical stability of ﬁndings, in a ﬁnal step
across-experiment comparison was conducted for hits and false
alarms as well as discrimination accuracy Pr and recognition
bias Br.
BETWEEN STUDIES COMPARISON
A mixed ANOVA with the between factors Experiment and
the within factor Cue (TBR, TBF, UI) and Response Type (hits
and false alarms) and two additional separate ANOVAs for
discrimination accuracy Pr and recognition bias Br, again with
the between factor Experiment and the within factor Cue (TBR,
TBF, UI), were calculated for the data from all 122 participants.
FIGURE 6 | Experiment 4. (A) Discrimination index for the condition Remember (R), Forget (F), and Un-cued (U). (B) Response bias for the three conditions.
∗p ≤ 0.05, ∗∗∗p ≤ 0.001.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 9 November 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 1741
Zwissler et al. Un-Cued Items in Directed Forgetting
Results
Hits and False Alarms
Mean hit and false-alarm rates are detailed in Table 5. Overall,
a main eﬀect on hits was found [F(2,242) = 96.99, p < 0.001;
η2p = 0.45]. TBR hit rate was signiﬁcantly higher than TBF and
UI hit rates (both ps< 0.001). Also, TBF hit rate was signiﬁcantly
higher than UI hit rate (p < 0.01). Hit rate did not interact
with experiment [F(6,236) = 0.97, p = 0.45; η2p = 0.02]. Across
experiments, there was a signiﬁcant main eﬀect on false alarms
[F(2,242) = 27.58, p < 0.001; η2p = 0.19]. Overall, false alarm
rate was lower for TBF compared to TBR (p < 0.05) and UI
(p< 0.001). TBR false alarm rate was also signiﬁcantly lower than
for UI (p< 0.001). False alarm rate diﬀered between experiments
[F(6,236) = 3.23, p < 0.01; η2p = 0.08]. False alarm rate was
signiﬁcantly lower in Experiment 1 compared to Experiment 2
(p < 0.001) and Experiment 3 (p < 0.001). Also, false alarm rate
was lower in Experiment 4 compared to Experiment 2 (p< 0.05).
Discrimination Accuracy and Response Bias
ANOVA conﬁrmed signiﬁcant diﬀerences in discrimination
accuracy Pr between diﬀerently cued stimuli [F(2,236) = 109.56,
p < 0.001; η2p = 0.48] and revealed that TBR were recognized
signiﬁcantly more accurately than TBF (p < 0.001) and UI
(p < 0.001). Crucially, TBF scored higher than UI (p < 0.001).
TABLE 5 | Overall comparisons across the four experiments.
Hits False Alarms
Remember Forget Un-cued Remember Forget Un-cued
0.74a 0.60b 0.57c 0.22a 0.20b 0.28c
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Mean hit and false alarm rates in the ‘remember,’ ‘forget,’ and ‘un-cued’ condition.
Standard errors appear in parentheses below means; means in the same row
sharing the same superscript letter do not differ significantly from each other, means
that do not share subscripts differ at p ≤ 0.05.
Discrimination accuracy did not diﬀer between experiments
[F(6,236) = 0.56, p = 0.76; η2p = 0.01]. Signiﬁcant diﬀerences
for recognition bias Br were found [F(1.73,203.98) = 25.56;
p < 0.001; η2p = 0.18]. TBF response bias was signiﬁcantly
more conservative than TBR (p < 0.001) and UI (p < 0.001).
UI response bias was also signiﬁcantly more conservative than
TBR (p = 0.001). Response bias interacted with experiment
[F(5.19,203.98) = 2.99, p < 0.05; η2p = 0.07]. Response bias was
signiﬁcantly more conservative in Experiment 1 compared to
Experiment 3 (p < 0.05). The results for this cross-experiment
analysis are shown in Figure 7.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
This series of experiments compared recognition memory for
items encoded under remember and forget instructions with
recognition memory for incidentally encoded items for which
no explicit instruction was given. Across four experiments,
discrimination accuracy was best for TBR and worst when no
speciﬁc instruction was given, leaving items to be implicitly
encoded. Relative to totally UI, TBF were remembered more
accurately, instead of equally well or worse than UI, and this
held even when the conditions were fully perceptually matched.
Better recognition of TBR than of TBF items is in line with the
view that the item-method DF eﬀect might be primarily due
to ‘selective rehearsal’ of TBR. Still, selective rehearsal might
not be fully able to account for why TBF were recognized
better than UI. The forget instruction has been shown to induce
inhibition in spatial attention using the IOR paradigm (Taylor,
2005; Taylor and Fawcett, 2011, 2012). However, it does not
seem to impair recognition accuracy in the same way as active
suppression has been shown to do in the Think-No Think
paradigm (e.g., Anderson et al., 2004) or as automatic inhibition
does in retrieval-induced forgetting (Anderson et al., 1994). An
active memory suppression view of DF is sometimes also adopted
in the clinical literature (e.g., Cottencin et al., 2006). Under
FIGURE 7 | Overall comparisons across the four experiments. (A) Discrimination index for the condition Remember (R), Forget (F), and Un-cued (U). (B)
Response bias for the three conditions. ∗∗∗p ≤ 0.001.
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such a memory suppression account, memory for TBF should be
even worse than for incidentally encoded baseline items. Such
a pattern might also have occurred, had participants diverted
capacities to UI items to distract themselves from TBF as has
been shown for item-method DF and the illusionary loudness
eﬀect (see Foster and Sahakyan, 2012). The baseline condition
involved both mere presentation of UI (Experiments 1 and 2)
and additional presentation of perceptually matched symbolic
cues (Experiments 3 and 4). Upon testing, UI were consistently
recognized less accurately than TBF. Whereas the experiments
diﬀered in the extent to which this was due to diﬀerences in
hits or false alarms, hit rate was never higher for UI than for
TBF and false alarm rate was never higher for TBF than for UI.
In its traditional version, selective rehearsal can explain more
accurate recognition of TBR compared to TBF and UI, but not
more accurate recognition of TBF than UI. Conversely, active
inhibition eﬀects on recognition memory might predict worse
recognition of TBF compared to both TBR and UI. Evidently,
in the present experiments active processing of TBF, even with
the intention to forget, did not reduce memory to the same
extent as no processing instruction at all. Indeed, extending cue-
processing time in this paradigm has been shown to improve
rather than impair memory for TBF (Bancroft et al., 2013). Thus,
whatever active processes occur in item-method DF, these do
not necessarily induce successful memory inhibition compared
to incidental encoding, although they do result in inhibitory
phenomena in other domains (Fawcett and Taylor, 2008; Taylor
and Fawcett, 2012; Lee and Hsu, 2013). Accordingly, frontal
brain activations previously observed in this design (Hauswald
et al., 2011; Nowicka et al., 2011; van Hooﬀ and Ford, 2011;
Rizio and Dennis, 2013) may result from either non-inhibitory
processes within the frontal lobes, such as conﬂict monitoring
(Silvetti et al., 2014) or attention orienting (Chun and Turk-
Browne, 2007) or perhaps from unsuccessful inhibition attempts.
The latter view would be consistent with the operation of
ironic monitoring (Wegner et al., 1987; Wegner, 1994, 1997;
Wenzlaﬀ and Wegner, 2000) as well as ﬁndings from cognitive
linguistics demonstrating the extra cognitive load of having
to process negative statements (Kaup, 2001; Ferguson et al.,
2008; Lüdtke et al., 2008). Overall, the forget cue may induce
automatic reprocessing of the associated item, causing the present
eﬀect. The reality of the ﬁndings is underscored by the fact
that participants were oﬀered monetary incentive for accurate
performance.
Of course, there are ambiguities associated with leaving
participants to their own devices in an experiment and presenting
material that is not associated with any speciﬁc instruction.
Behavioral data cannot fully answer the question of what
participants actually do when receiving an UI versus an TBF
instructions, although incidental encoding situations are quite
natural and have been amply used in the literature (e.g., Craik
and Lockhart, 1972; Hockley, 2008; Hockley et al., 2015). By
some TBF might be considered as even stricter F cues. However,
an explicit ignore instruction (as in variants of list-method
DF) was never given here, UI were just not commented on.
Also, participants could have been confused about the diﬀerence
between TBF and UI items. We asked participants whether there
were problems with the instruction and, at least on the self-
report level, there was no indication of confusion. Moreover, data
on eﬀects of left prefrontal tDCS stimulation acquired in the
context of Experiment 3 (Zwissler et al., 2014) show that for the
R and the F conditions cathodal and anodal left prefrontal tDCS
stimulation had antagonistic eﬀects on false alarm rate. However,
neither anodal nor cathodal tDCS aﬀected the UI condition
compared to the sham condition whose data are reported
here. This underscores that both F-cued and R-cued induce,
albeit qualitatively diﬀerent, active processes in the prefrontal
cortex that are not activated when the perceptual symbol is not
associated with a speciﬁc memory instruction as in UI. Similarly,
EEG data acquired in the context of Experiment 4 indicate
qualitative processing diﬀerences between all three conditions. In
particular, a previously identiﬁed frontal positivity, at the time
suggested to indicate active inhibition (Hauswald et al., 2011),
was larger for F than for UI and R items, the UI positivity being
also larger than the frontal R positivity. By contrast, a parietal
positivity indexing selective rehearsal was larger for R than for
both F and UI items, F being again larger than UI. Both the
tDCS and the EEG data are in line with the notion that the
F-cue induces active, but regarding recognition memory, non-
inhibitory processing which is qualitatively diﬀerent from the
type of processing induced by the R cue. Crucially, F cues result in
less eﬀective forgetting than a cue that does not explicitly specify
a memory instruction.
It cannot be completely ruled out that participants did
not follow the given instructions but instead rehearsed items
independently of instruction across an entire set, especially
in case of semantically interrelated stimuli (i.e., cars, humans,
animals). However, due to the size and the thematic diversity
of the image sets, a systematic distortion seems rather unlikely.
Finally, in Experiments 3 and 4, we chose to resolve the physical
diﬀerence between behaviorally relevant cues (R, F) and the
irrelevant one (U) by assigning a symbol to each of them. This
might raise the question whether a symbol carrying no meaning
still qualiﬁes as a non-existent cue. Results do not suggest
a major diﬀerence between the ﬁrst and the last experiment.
Experimenters can never be quite sure what participants really
do, even when they receive an explicit instruction, and the
problem might be exacerbated when no instruction is given.
On the other hand, free viewing and uninstructed processing
is a very natural situation as much of the material that is
encountered in everyday life is not associated with explicit
instructions and sometimes arguably not even with an intrinsic
goal. Therefore having a certain proportion of stimuli that is
not associated with an explicit instruction would appear quite
natural in many situations. Indeed, the data pattern suggests
that across participants there was a systematic response to UI as
well as to TBR or TBF. Free viewing has been used in various
areas of perception (Junghöfer et al., 2001; Kissler et al., 2007)
and memory (Potter and Levy, 1969; Potter, 1976) research.
Present data incorporating a free viewing condition indicate that
even under fully perceptually matched conditions discrimination
accuracy for items not associated with a speciﬁc instruction is
poorer than for items explicitly instructed to be forgotten and that
only these are truly ignored and decay passively.
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There were also eﬀects on the response bias: It is notable
that these depart from what would be expected under a
typical TBR strengthening account. Typically, strengthening
items leads to a more conservative response bias (Stretch and
Wixted, 1998). Thus, TBR items should have been responded
to more conservatively than the other item types, UI showing
the most liberal response bias. Yet, TBF were by-and-large
responded to most conservatively, which could be indicative of
a separate eﬀect of the forget instruction on how participants
set their response criterion. Indeed, across experiments false
alarm rate was always lowest for TBF. Eﬀects on response bias
are generally more apparent with higher false alarm rates and
lower hit rates, as in Experiments 2 and 3, where TBF were
responded to less readily than TBR and UI. That is, in spite of
monetary incentive to the contrary, participants required more
mnemonic evidence to make an ‘old’ decision to TBF than to
the other item types. The initial forget instruction may induce
a subjective underrepresentation of the frequency of forget
items on the test list which would have reduced participants’
willingness to endorse these items as old (Strack and Förster,
1995; Hirshman and Henzler, 1998). Perhaps this reﬂects one
aspect of the inhibitory processing found to be induced by
the forget instruction in other contexts. Such a bias may be
beneﬁcial in legal settings, resulting in a reduced tendency to
misidentify look-alikes of an exonerated former suspect from
a line-up. Unfortunately, for a mere bystander (UI in our
context), misidentiﬁcation tendencies might be higher at least
under some circumstances. Further research will specify how
diﬀerent memory instructions interact with other experimental
parameters in item-method DF.
Even where it occurs, a conservative response bias apparently
cannot compensate for the initial alerting process. As a
consequence, both TBR and TBF are remembered more
accurately than UI. Several ﬁndings (e.g., Lee et al., 2007; Fawcett
and Taylor, 2008, 2010) suggest that TBF are not instantaneously
toned down during learning. Rather, even TBF beneﬁt from
longer post-cue intervals. Presumably, when a stimulus is
presented, it is being held online to begin with. After onset of a
‘meaningful’ cue (i.e., R and F), both these stimulus types receive
special attention. Only for UI, it seems that processing ceases
after stimulus oﬀ-set. This happens even when UI are followed
by a perceptually equivalent symbolic cue to which no cognitive
signiﬁcance is assigned. The eﬀect is seen in each individual
experiment and underscored by the cross-experiment analysis,
where it is seen for both hit rate and discrimination accuracy
with no cross-experiment interaction. Still, visually the above
experiments diﬀer in the extent to which this eﬀect is carried by
hits versus false alarms. Future research will further specify the
dynamics of the present phenomenon, however, tentatively, list
length and overall target discrimination levels could be important
factors.
The present results may appear surprising in view of
experimental evidence of successful representational inhibition
of target items compared to baseline in the Think-No Think
paradigm (Anderson and Green, 2001; Anderson et al., 2004).
In the Think-No Think paradigm and in item-method DF as
in cognitive control in general, prefrontal structures have been
shown to be involved (Mitchell et al., 2007; Wylie et al., 2008;
Giuliano and Wicha, 2010). In DF, prefrontal cerebral activity
during cue presentation diﬀerentiates intentionally forgotten
from incidentally forgotten items (Wylie et al., 2008). Further
research will resolve whether the F-instruction’s paradoxical
eﬀect is solely due to a short-lived alerting elicited by the F cue.
Incorporating un-cued baseline stimuli in neuroscientiﬁc studies
of DF will aid interpretation of previously observed eﬀects.
Of note, the present studies all used pictorial material and
did not test free recall. An important extension of this work
will concern the question whether similar results can be found
with verbal material and in free recall. So far, data suggest that
in item-method DF, pictorial and verbal materials behave in
similar ways (Hourihan et al., 2009; Quinlan et al., 2010), but
ﬁrm conclusions await further empirical tests. Also, the use of
thematically matched pairs may have been problematic. As in
some previous research (Zwissler et al., 2011, 2012), this approach
had been used to facilitate scoring of hits and false alarms per
item category. However, participants may have noticed that the
material was organized in pairs and this may have biased their
responses in unforseeable ways. The most obvious possibility is
that participants on presentation of the second picture from such
a thematic pair realized that they had gotten the ﬁrst one wrong
because they hadmade a gist-based decision. While this may have
helped them on the second decision, they could not undo the ﬁrst
response and therefore the procedure enhanced noise in the data.
Most likely, such noise would be distributed equally across all
conditions. Still, there is the possibility that such eﬀects interacted
with instruction in hitherto unknown ways.
For the current methods and materials, the current study
raises the possibility that item-method DF could involve ironic
processes. Initially, two operations may be required: one to
remember TBR, which is a common task for students; the second
is to forget TBF, which is comparably unusual. As Wegner
(1994) suggests, under mental load resources are drawn from the
operating process and an ironic monitoring process takes over
interfering with thought control, or presently, with successful
forgetting.
The present research demonstrates that item-method DF
occurs only in comparison to a ‘remember’ instruction and
not compared to giving no instruction at all. Thus, regarding
recognition accuracy, the F-cue induces active, but not inhibitory
processing. These results are in line with other ﬁndings
demonstrating that humans have trouble processing negative
information and have practical implications for educational and
legal settings.
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